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Abstract
We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window
model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders,
represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general
existence proof of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium that allows one of the
two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a
corollary proved by Shitovitz (1973), that a Cournot-Nash allocation
is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a Walras allocation.
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1 Introduction
Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) introduced the so-called model of bilateral
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33100 Udine, Italy, and Economix, UPL, Univ Paris Nanterre, CNRS, F92000 Nanterre,
France.
§Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, United
Kingdom.
¶Economix, UPL, Univ Paris Nanterre, CNRS, F92000 Nanterre, France.
‖Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Udine,
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trader holds only one of the two commodities available for trade. In this
framework, strategic interaction among traders was modeled as in strategic
market games à la Shapley and Shubik (see Giraud (2003) for a survey of
this literature). This model was analyzed, in the case of a finite number of
traders, by Bloch and Ghosal (1997), Bloch and Ferrer (2001), Dickson and
Hartley (2008), Amir and Bloch (2009), among others.
In this paper, we consider the mixed bilateral oligopoly model introduced
by Codognato et al. (2015). Following Shitovitz (1973), this model analyzes
a mixed economy with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders,
represented by an atomless part. Noncooperative exchange is formalized
as in the Shapley window model, a strategic market game which was first
proposed informally by Lloyd S. Shapley and further analyzed by Sahi and
Yao (1989), Codognato and Ghosal (2000), Busetto et al. (2011), Busetto
et al. (2018), among others.
The first goal of the paper is to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium for the mixed bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window
model. Busetto et al. (2011) provided an existence proof for the mixed
version of the Shapley window model with any finite number of commodi-
ties. Their proof is based on the same assumptions as the proof provided
by Sahi and Yao (1989) for the case of exchange economies with a finite
number of traders. In particular, it requires that there are at least two
atoms with strictly positive endowments, continuously differentiable utility
functions, and indifference curves contained in the strict interior of the com-
modity space: these restrictions are stated by Busetto et al. (2011) in their
Assumption 4. Clearly, this proof does not apply to the bilateral oligopoly
case where all atoms hold only one of the two commodities. Busetto et al.
(2018) proposed an alternative existence proof which is essentially based
on restrictions on endowments and preference of the atomless part of the
economy rather than on atoms. In particular, they kept all the assumptions
made by Busetto et al. (2011) with the exception of their Assumption 4,
which was replaced by a new restriction requiring that the set of commodities
is strongly connected through the characteristics of traders in the atomless
part. The existence proof in Busetto et al. (2018) used a theorem which
shows that any sequence of prices corresponding to a sequence of Cournot-
Nash equilibria has a subsequence which converges to a strictly positive price
vector and it requires that each commodity is held by a subset of the atom-
less part with positive measure. An appealing feature of our existence result
is that it allows a commodity to be held only by atoms. The case of atoms,
oligopolists, on one side of the market, facing an atomless part, on the other
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side, is the one closest to the basic oligopoly model considered by Cournot
(1838). In order to cover this case, we cannot directly use the price conver-
gence theorem shown by Busetto et al. (2018) but we have to combine that
proof with the price convergence result proved by Dubey and Shubik (1978),
which holds for a strategic market game with a finite number of traders, i.e.,
for a purely atomic exchange economy. This is one reason why our existence
proof is not just a two-commodity case of that provided by Busetto et al.
(2018). There is one more difference between the two results. A step in the
proof of both existence theorems consists in showing that the aggregate bid
matrix, obtained as the limit of a sequence of perturbed Cournot-Nash equi-
libria, is irreducible. In Busetto et al. (2018), obtaining this result requires
that the two ordered pairs generated by the two traded commodities are
connected through traders’ characteristics. Here, instead, we impose that
there is a coalition of traders in the atomless part with differentiable and
additively separable utility functions which have infinite partial derivatives
along the boundary of the consumption set. This can be seen as an atom-
less version of an assumption on utility functions made by Bloch and Ferrer
(2001) to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in their finite,
purely atomic, bilateral framework.
In the second main theorem of the paper, we provide a characteriza-
tion of the Pareto optimality of Cournot-Nash allocations. The issue of
Pareto optimality in strategic market games was raised since the seminal
paper by Shapley and Shubik (1977). This first analysis was mainly an in-
tuitive discussion of Pareto optimality in the Edgeworth box. Then, more
formal results on this issue were obtained by Dubey (1980), Dubey et al.
(1980), Aghion (1985), Dubey and Rogawski (1990), among others. These
results were obtained using the approach to general equilibrium based on
differential topology and hold generically. Our second theorem is a general
result stating that a Cournot-Nash allocation is Pareto optimal if and only
if it is a Walras allocation. This result establishes a relationship among the
Cournotian tradition of oligopoly, the Walrasian tradition of perfect compe-
tition, and the Paretian analysis of optimality. Some examples computed by
Codognato et al. (2015) provide evidence that this characterization holds
non-vacuously.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the math-
ematical model. In section 3, we prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. In Section 4, we characterize the Pareto optimality of Cournot-
Nash equilibria. In Section 5, we discuss the model. In Section 6, we draw
some conclusions and we sketch some further lines of research.
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2 Mathematical model
We consider a pure exchange economy with large traders, represented as
atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. The space of
traders is denoted by the measure space (T, T , µ), where T is the set of
traders, T is the σ-algebra of all µ-measurable subsets of T , and µ is a real
valued, non-negative, countably additive measure defined on T . We assume
that (T, T , µ) is finite, i.e., µ(T ) <∞. This implies that the measure space
(T, T , µ) contains at most countably many atoms. Let T1 denote the set
of atoms and T0 the atomless part of T . We assume that µ(T1) > 0 and
µ(T0) > 0.
1 A null set of traders is a set of measure 0. Null sets of traders are
systematically ignored throughout the paper. Thus, a statement asserted for
“each” trader in a certain set is to be understood to hold for all such traders
except possibly for a null set of traders. A coalition is a nonnull element of
T . The word “integrable” is to be understood in the sense of Lebesgue.
In the exchange economy, there are 2 different commodities. A com-
modity bundle is a point in R2+. An assignment (of commodity bundles
to traders) is an integrable function x: T → R2+. There is a fixed initial
assignment w, satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 1. There is a coalition S such that w1(t) > 0, w2(t) = 0, for
each t ∈ S, w1(t) = 0, w2(t) > 0, for each t ∈ Sc. Moreover, card(S ∩T1) ≥
2, whenever µ(S∩T0) = 0, and card(Sc∩T1) ≥ 2, whenever µ(Sc∩T0) = 0.2
An allocation is an assignment x such that
∫
T x(t) dµ =
∫
T w(t) dµ.
The preferences of each trader t ∈ T are described by a utility function
ut : R
2
+ → R, satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. ut : R
2
+ → R is continuous, strongly monotone, and quasi-
concave, for each t ∈ T .
Let B denote the Borel σ-algebra of R2+. Moreover, let T
⊗
B denote
the σ-algebra generated by the sets E × F such that E ∈ T and F ∈ B.
Assumption 3. u : T × R2+ → R, given by u(t, x) = ut(x), for each t ∈ T
and for each x ∈ R2+, is T
⊗
B-measurable.
The following assumption is an atomless version of the second assump-
tion on utility functions made by Bloch and Ferrer (2001) in their finite,
purely atomic, bilateral framework.
1The symbol 0 denotes the origin of R2+ as well as the real number zero: no confusion
will result.
2card(A) denotes the cardinality of a set A.
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Assumption 4. There is a coalition T̄ , with T̄ ⊂ T0, such that ut(·) is
differentiable, additively separable, i.e., ut(x) = v
1
t (x
1) + v2t (x
2), for each
x ∈ R2+, and
dvjt (0)
dxj
= +∞, j ∈ {1, 2}, for each t ∈ T̄ .3
A price vector is a nonnull vector p ∈ R2+. We say that a price vector p




Let X0 : T0 × R2++ → P(R2+) be a correspondence such that, for each
t ∈ T0 and for each p ∈ R2++, X0(t, p) = argmax{ut(x) : x ∈ R2+ and px ≤
pw(t)}. For each p ∈ R2++, let
∫
T0
X0(t, p) dµ = {
∫
T0
x0(t, p) dµ : x0(·, p)
is integrable and x0(t, p) ∈ X0(t, p), for each t ∈ T0}. Finally, let Z0 :
R2++ → P(R2) be a correspondence which associates with each p ∈ R2++ the
Minkowski difference between the set
∫
T0




dµ}.4 According to Debreu (1982), let |x| =
∑2
i=1 |xi|, for each x ∈ R2,
and let d[0, V ] = infx∈V |x|, for each V ⊂ R2. The next proposition, which
we shall use in the proof of the existence theorem in Section 3, is based on
Property (iv) in Debreu (1982), p. 728.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, let {pn} be a sequence of
normalized price vectors such that pn  0, for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, which
converges to a normalized price vector p̄. Then, p̄1 = 0 and µ(Sc ∩ T0) > 0,
or, p̄2 = 0 and µ(S∩T0) > 0, imply that the sequence {d[0,Z0(pn)]} diverges
to +∞.
Proof. Let {pn} be a sequence of normalized price vectors such that pn  0,
for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, which converges to a normalized price vector p̄.
Suppose that p̄1 = 0 and µ(Sc ∩ T0) > 0. Then, we have that p̄2 = 1.
But then, the sequence {d[0,X0(t, pn)]} diverges to +∞ as p̄2w2(t) > 0,
for each t ∈ Sc ∩ T0, by Lemma 4 in Debreu (1982), p. 721. Therefore,
{d[0,Z0(pn)]} diverges to +∞ as µ(Sc ∩ T0) > 0, by the argument used in
the proof of Property (iv) in Debreu (1982), p. 728. Suppose that p̄2 = 0 and
µ(S∩T0) > 0. Then, {d[0,Z0(pn)]} diverges to +∞, by using symmetrically
the previous argument. Hence, p̄1 = 0 and µ(Sc ∩ T0) > 0, or, p̄2 = 0 and
µ(S ∩ T0) > 0, imply that the sequence {d[0,Z0(pn)]} diverges to +∞.
A Walras equilibrium is a pair (p,x), consisting of a price vector p and
an allocation x, such that px(t) = pw(t) and ut(x(t)) ≥ ut(y), for all y ∈
3In this paper, differentiability means continuous differentiability and is to be under-
stood to include the case of infinite partial derivatives along the boundary of the con-
sumption set (for a discussion of this case, see, for instance, Kreps (2012), p. 58).
4For a discussion of the properties of the correspondences introduced above and their
proofs see, for instance, Debreu (1982), Section 4.
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{x ∈ R2+ : px = pw(t)}, for each t ∈ T . A Walras allocation is an allocation
x for which there exists a price vector p such that the pair (p,x) is a Walras
equilibrium.
Borrowing from Codognato et al. (2015), we introduce now the two-com-
modity version of the Shapley window model. A strategy correspondence is
a correspondence B : T → P(R4+) such that, for each t ∈ T , B(t) = {(bij) ∈
R4+ :
∑2
j=1 bij ≤ wi(t), i ∈ {1, 2}}. With some abuse of notation, we denote
by b(t) ∈ B(t) a strategy of trader t, where bij(t), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, represents
the amount of commodity i that trader t offers in exchange for commodity
j. A strategy selection is an integrable function b : T → R4+, such that, for
each t ∈ T , b(t) ∈ B(t). Given a strategy selection b, we call “aggregate
matrix” the matrix B̄ such that b̄ij = (
∫
T bij(t) dµ), i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover,
we denote by b \ b(t) the strategy selection obtained from b by replacing
b(t) with b(t) ∈ B(t) and by B̄ \ b(t) the corresponding aggregate matrix.
Consider the following two further definitions (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Definition 1. A nonnegative square matrix A is said to be irreducible if, for
every pair (i, j), with i 6= j, there is a positive integer k such that a(k)ij > 0,
where a
(k)
ij denotes the ij-th entry of the k-th power A
k of A.









b̄ji), j ∈ {1, 2}. (1)
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), there is a unique, up to a scalar
multiple, price vector p satisfying (1) if and only if B̄ is irreducible. Then,
we denote by p(b) a function which associates with each strategy selection
b the unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector p satisfying (1), if B̄ is
irreducible, and is equal to 0, otherwise. For each strategy selection b such
that p(b) 0, we assume that the price vector p(b) is normalized.
Given a strategy selection b and a price vector p, consider the assignment
determined as follows:









, if p ∈ R2++,
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t), otherwise,
j ∈ {1, 2}, for each t ∈ T .
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Given a strategy selection b and the function p(b), traders’ final holdings
are determined according to this rule and consequently expressed by the
assignment
x(t) = x(t,b(t), p(b)),
for each t ∈ T .5 It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an
allocation.
We are now able to define a notion of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for this
reformulation of the Shapley window model (see Codognato and Ghosal
(2000) and Busetto et al. (2011)).
Definition 3. A strategy selection b̂ such that
¯̂
B is irreducible is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium if
ut(x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂))) ≥ ut(x(t, b(t), p(b̂ \ b(t)))),
for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T .
A Cournot-Nash allocation is an allocation x̂ such that x̂(t) = x(t, b̂(t),
p(b̂)), for each t ∈ T , where b̂ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we introduce the same type of perturbation of the strategic mar-
ket game which was used by Sahi and Yao (1989) and Busetto et al. (2011)
to prove their existence theorems. Given ε > 0 and a strategy selection b,
we define the aggregate matrix B̄ε as the matrix such that b̄εij = (b̄ij + ε),
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Clearly, the matrix B̄ε is irreducible. The interpretation is that
an outside agency places fixed bids of ε for each pair of commodities 1 and
2. Given ε > 0, we denote by pε(b) the function which associates, with each








(b̄ji + ε)), j ∈ {1, 2}. (2)
For each strategy selection b, we assume that the price vector pε(b) is nor-
malized.
Definition 4. Given ε > 0, a strategy selection b̂ε is an ε-Cournot-Nash
equilibrium if
ut(x(t, b̂
ε(t), pε(b̂ε))) ≥ ut(x(t, b(t), pε(b̂ε \ b(t)))),
for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T .
5In order to save in notation, with some abuse we denote by x both the function x(t)
and the function x(t,b(t), p(b)).
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3 Existence
In this section, we state and prove our first main theorem, establishing the
existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the two-commodity version of
the Shapley window model presented above.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium b̂.
Proof. The first step in the proof of Theorem 1 requires that we show the
existence of an ε-Cournot-Nash equilibrium. To this end, we use a result
already proved by Busetto et al. (2011) by applying the Kakutani-Fan-
Glicksberg theorem. It is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For each ε > 0, there exists an ε-Cournot-Nash equilibrium b̂ε.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 3 in Busetto et al. (2011).
Then, we have to show that there exists the limit of a sequence of ε-
Cournot-Nash equilibria and that this limit is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Let εn =
1
n , n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. By Lemma 1, for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, there is an
ε-Cournot-Nash equilibrium b̂εn . The next step consists in showing that any
sequence of normalized prices generated by the sequence of ε-Cournot-Nash
equilibria corresponding to the sequence {εn} has a convergent subsequence
whose limit is a strictly positive normalized price vector. In order to prove
this result, we cannot use the price convergence theorem proved by Busetto
et al. (2018) as the proof of this theorem requires that each commodity is
held by a subset of the atomless part with positive measure whereas, in our
framework, one of the two commodities may be held only by atoms. There-
fore, we have to combine the price convergence proof provided by Busetto
et al. (2018) with another price convergence proof, proposed by Dubey and
Shubik (1978), which holds for a purely atomic exchange economy. To this
end, we need to introduce the following preliminary lemma, based on the
uniform monotonicity lemma proved by Dubey and Shubik (1978).
Lemma 2. Consider an atom τ ∈ T1 and a commodity j ∈ {1, 2}. For
each real number H > 0, there is a real number 0 < h(uτ (·), j,H) < 1,
depending on uτ (·), j, and H, such that if x ∈ R2+, ‖x‖ ≤ H, y ∈ R2+ and
‖y − x‖ ≤ h(uτ (·), j,H), then uτ (y + ej) > uτ (x).6
6‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm and ej denotes the vector whose jth coordinate is 1
and whose other coordinate vanishes.
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Proof. It is an immediate consequence of Lemma C (the uniform mono-
tonicity lemma) in Dubey and Shubik (1978) as uτ (·) is continuous and
strongly monotone, by Assumption 2.
We can now state and prove the price convergence lemma.
Lemma 3. Let {p̂εn} be a sequence of normalized prices such that {p̂εn} =
p(b̂εn) where b̂εn is an ε-Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
Then, there exists a subsequence {p̂εkn} of the sequence {p̂εn} which con-
verges to a normalized price vector p̂ 0.
Proof. Let {p̂εn} be a sequence of normalized prices such that {p̂εn} =
pεn(b̂εn), where b̂εn is an ε-Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
Then, there is a subsequence {p̂εkn} of the sequence {p̂εn} which converges
to a price vector p̂ ∈ ∆, as the unit simplex ∆ is a compact set. Consider
the case where µ(S ∩ T0) > 0 and µ(Sc ∩ T0) > 0. Suppose, without loss
of generality, that p̂1 = 0. Then, the sequence {d[0,Z0(p̂εkn )]} diverges to
+∞ as µ(Sc ∩ T0) > 0, by Proposition 1. We adapt now to our framework
the argument used by Busetto et al. (2018) to prove their Theorem 1. Let
x̂εn(t) = x(t, b̂εn(t), pεn(b̂εn)), for each t ∈ T , and for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
Then, x̂εn(t) ∈ X0(t, pεn), for each t ∈ T0, and for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, by
the same argument used by Codognato and Ghosal (2000) to prove their






w(t) dµ) ∈ Z0(p̂εn), for each














T w(t) dµ+ εne
1 + εne















wi(t) dµ − 1 ≤
∫
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x̂iεkn (t) dµ −
∫
T0
wi(t) dµ| ≥ d[0,Z0(p̂εkn )], for each n ≥ n0,
a contradiction. Therefore, we must have that p̂1 > 0. Consider the case
where µ(S ∩ T0) = 0 or µ(Sc ∩ T0) = 0. Suppose, without loss of generality,
that µ(S ∩ T0) = 0. Then, we have that µ(Sc ∩ T0) > 0 as µ(T0) > 0.
Moreover, there are at least two atoms τ, ρ ∈ S ∩ T1, by Assumption 1. We
have that p̂1 > 0, as µ(Sc∩T0) > 0, by the same argument used in the proof
of the previous case. In order to prove that p̂2 > 0, we now show that there




for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. To this end, we adapt to our framework the proof
of Lemma 2 in Dubey and Shubik (1978). In what follows, we shall use the
fact that (2) and the normalization rule imply straightforwardly that (3)





























































2 . Moreover, suppose that w
1(τ) − b̂εn12(τ) ≥
w1(τ)
2 . Let











} and let bγ(τ) = b̂εn(τ) + γe2. Then, we
have
x1(τ, bγ(τ), pεn(b̂εn \ bγ(τ)))− x1(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn))





x2(τ, bγ(τ), pεn(b̂εn \ bγ(τ)))− x2(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn))
































































2 and γ < εn. Then, we obtain






















Then, we have the vector inequality
x(τ, bγ(τ), pεn(b̂εn \ bγ(τ)))










γ(z + e2), (5)







2(t) dµ+1} and let y = x(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn))+
z. It is straightforward to verify that x(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn)) ∈ R2+ and
‖x(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn))‖ ≤ H. Suppose that y ∈ R2+ and ‖z‖ ≤ h(uτ (·), 2, H).
Then, by Lemma 2, we obtain that
uτ (x(τ, b̂
εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn)) + z + e2) > uτ (x(τ, b̂
εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn))).













γ(z+e2)) ≥ uτ (x(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn))),
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γ < 1 and the function uτ (·) is quasi-concave, by Assumption
2. Therefore, it follows that
uτ (x(τ, b
γ(τ), pεn(b̂εn \ bγ(τ)))) > uτ (x(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn))),
as (5) holds strictly for its second component and uτ (·) is strongly monotone,
by Assumption 2, a contradiction. Thus, it must be that y /∈ R2+ or ‖z‖ >
h(uτ (·), 2, H). Suppose that y /∈ R2+. Then, it follows that










as y = x(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn)) + z and x(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn)) ∈ R2+. But then,













as x1(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn)) = w1(τ) − b̂εn12(τ) ≥
w1(τ)
2 . Suppose that ‖z‖ >










h(uτ (·), 2, H)
2
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Suppose now that w1(τ) − b̂εn12(τ) <
w1(τ)






































































for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Consider the sequence {p̂εkn}. From (3), we obtain
that
p̂2εkn > ηp̂1εkn ,
for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Then, we obtain that
p̂2 > ηp̂1,
as the sequence {p̂εkn} converges to p̂. But then, we have that p̂2 > 0 as
η > 0 and p̂1 > 0. Hence, having considered all possible cases, we can
conclude that p̂ 0.
We now follow the argument used by Busetto et al. (2018) to prove their
Theorem 2. In the next part of the proof, we apply a generalization of the
Fatou lemma in several dimensions provided by Artstein (1979). By Lemma
1, there is an ε-Cournot-Nash equilibrium b̂εn , for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. The
fact that the sequence { ¯̂B
εn
} belongs to the compact set {(bij) ∈ R4+ : bij ≤∫
T w
i(t) dµ, i, j ∈ {1, 2}} and the sequence {p̂εn}, where p̂εn = pεn(b̂εn),
belongs to the unit simplex ∆, for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, implies that there is
a subsequence { ¯̂B
εkn} of the sequence { ¯̂B
εn
} which converges to an element
of the set {(bij) ∈ R4+ : bij ≤
∫
T w
i(t) dµ, i, j ∈ {1, 2}} and a subsequence
{p̂εkn} of the sequence {p̂εn} which converges to a price vector p̂ ∈ ∆, with
p̂ 0, by Lemma 3. Since the sequence {b̂εkn} satisfies the assumptions of
Theorem A in Artstein (1979), by this theorem there is a function b̂ such
that b̂(t) is a limit point of the sequence {b̂εkn (t)}, for each t ∈ T , and such
that the sequence { ¯̂B






satisfy (2), for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, the sequence {p̂εkn}
converges to p̂, the sequence { ¯̂B
εkn} converges to ¯̂B, and the sequence {εkn}
converges to 0. Suppose, without loss of generality, that µ(Sc ∩ T̄ ) > 0.
We now show that
¯̂
b21 > 0. Suppose that
¯̂
b21 = 0. Then, we have that
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∫
Sc∩T̄ b̂21(t) dµ = 0 as µ(S
c ∩ T̄ ) > 0. Consider a trader τ ∈ Sc ∩ T̄ . We can
suppose that b̂21(τ) = 0 as we ignore null sets. Since b̂(τ) is a limit point of
the sequence {b̂εkn (τ)}, there is a subsequence {b̂εhkn (τ)} of this sequence
which converges to b̂(τ). Let x̂εn(τ) = x(τ, b̂εn(τ), pεn(b̂εn)), for each n ∈
{1, 2, . . .}, and x̂(τ) = x(τ, b̂(τ), p̂). Then, the subsequence {x̂εhkn (τ)} of the
sequence {x̂εn(τ)} converges to x̂(τ) as the sequence {b̂εhkn (τ)} converges
to b̂(τ) and the sequence {p̂εhkn } converges to p̂, with p̂εhkn  0, for each
n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, and p̂ 0. But then, it must be that x̂1(τ) = 0 as b̂21(τ) = 0
and x̂(τ) ∈ X0(τ, p̂) as x̂εhkn (τ) ∈ X0(τ, p̂εhkn ), for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, and
the correspondence X0(τ, ·) is upper hemicontinuous, by the argument used
in Debreu (1982), p. 721. Therefore, we have that ∂uτ (x̂(τ))
∂x1
= +∞ by
Assumption 4 and ∂uτ (x̂(τ))
∂x1
≤ λp̂1, by the necessary conditions of the Kuhn-
Tucker theorem. Moreover, it must be that x̂2(τ) = w2(τ) > 0 as uτ (·) is
strongly monotone, by Assumption 2, and p̂w(τ) > 0. Then, ∂uτ (x̂(τ))
∂x2
=
λp̂2, by the necessary conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. But then,
∂uτ (x̂(τ))
∂x2
= +∞ as λ = +∞, contradicting the assumption that uτ (·) is
continuously differentiable. Therefore, we can conclude that
¯̂
b21 > 0. It is













for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Then, we must have that ¯̂b12 > 0 as the sequence
{p̂εkn} converges to p̂, the sequence { ¯̂B
εkn} converges to ¯̂B, the sequence
{εkn} converges to 0, p̂  0, and
¯̂
b21 > 0. But then,
¯̂
B is irreducible.
Consider a trader τ ∈ T1. The matrix ¯̂B\b(τ) is irreducible as ¯̂b21\b(τ) > 0,





B\b(τ). Then, the matrix ¯̂B\b(t) is irreducible, for each
t ∈ T . But then, from the same argument used by Busetto et al. (2011) in
their existence proof (Cases 1 and 3), it follows that ut(x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂))) ≥
ut(x(t, b(t), p(b̂ \ b(t)))), for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T . Hence, b̂
is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
4 Optimality
In this section, we study the Pareto optimality properties of a Cournot-Nash
allocation for the two-commodity version of the Shapley window model.
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Shapley and Shubik (1977) first raised the question of the Pareto opti-
mality features of Cournot-Nash allocations in the context of the proto-
typical strategic market games they proposed in that work. Nevertheless,
their analysis was mainly based on examples drawn in an Edgeworth box.
Then, some more general results about the Pareto optimality properties of
Cournot-Nash allocations of strategic market games were obtained, both for
exchange economies with a finite number of traders and with an atomless
continuum of traders, by Dubey (1980), Dubey et al. (1980), Aghion (1985),
Dubey and Rogawski (1990), among others. Their theorems were obtained
in a framework of differential topology and hold generically.7 Here, we ex-
tend the Pareto optimality analysis to our mixed version of the Shapley
window model and we obtain a general result which characterizes Pareto
optimal Cournot-Nash allocations as Walras allocations. To this end, we
need to introduce the following further definitions. An allocation x is said
to be individually rational if ut(x(t)) ≥ ut(w(t)), for each t ∈ T . An allo-
cation x is said to be Pareto optimal if there is no allocation y such that
ut(y(t)) > ut(x(t)), for each t ∈ T . An efficiency equilibrium is a pair (p,x),
consisting of a price vector p and an allocation x, such that ut(x(t)) ≥ ut(y),
for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : px = px(t)}, for each t ∈ T . We can now state and
prove our optimality theorem, which establishes an equivalence between the
set of Pareto optimal Cournot-Nash allocations and the set of Cournot-Nash
allocations, whenever the latter are also Walrasian.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let b̂ be a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium and let p̂ = p(b̂) and x̂(t) = x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂)), for each t ∈ T .
Then, x̂ is Pareto optimal if and only if the pair (p̂, x̂) is a Walras equilib-
rium.
Proof. Let b̂ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let p̂ = p(b̂) and x̂(t) =
x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂)), for each t ∈ T . Suppose that x̂ is Pareto optimal. We
adapt to our framework the argument used by Shitovitz (1973) to prove the
corollary to his Lemma 2. It is straightforward to verify that x̂ is individually
rational. Let Ĝ→ P(R2) be a correspondence such that Ĝ(t) = {x− x̂(t) :
x ∈ R2+ and ut(x) > ut(x̂(t))}, for each t ∈ T . Moreover, let
∫
T Ĝ(t) dµ =
{
∫
T ĝ(t) dµ : ĝ(t) is integrable and ĝ(t) ∈ Ĝ(t), for each t ∈ T}. The set
{x ∈ R2+ : ut(x) ≥ ut(x̂)} is convex as ut(·) is quasi-concave, by Assumption
2, for each t ∈ T1. Then, it is straightforward to verify that the set Ĝ(t)
is convex, for each t ∈ T1. But then,
∫
T Ĝ(t) dµ is convex, by Theorem 1
7For a discussion of this literature, see Giraud (2003), p. 359 and p. 365.
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in Shitovitz (1973). We now prove that 0 /∈
∫
T Ĝ(t) dµ. Suppose that 0 ∈∫
T Ĝ(t) dµ. Then, there is an assignment y such that ut(y(t)) > ut(x̂(t)), for
each t ∈ T , which is an allocation as
∫
T y(t) dµ =
∫
T x̂(t) dµ =
∫
T w(t) dµ.
But then, x̂ is not Pareto optimal, a contradiction. Therefore, it must be
that 0 /∈
∫
T Ĝ(t) dµ. Then, there exists a vector p̃ such that p̃ ∈ R
2, (p̃ 6= 0),
and p̃
∫
T Ĝ(t) dµ ≥ 0, by the supporting hyperplane theorem. But then, the
pair (p̃, x̂) is an efficiency equilibrium, by Lemma 2 in Shitovitz (1973). We
have that x̂(t) ∈ X0(t, p̂), by the same argument used by Codognato and
Ghosal (2000) to prove their Theorem 2, for each t ∈ T0. Consider a trader
τ ∈ T̄ and suppose that either x̂1(t) = 0 or x̂2(t) = 0. Then, the necessary
Kuhn-Tucker conditions lead, mutatis mutandis, to the same contradiction
as in the proof of our Theorem 1, by Assumption 4. But then, we have that


















as the pair (p̃, x̂) is an efficiency equilibrium, for each t ∈ T̄ . Then, there
exists a real number θ > 0 such that p̂1 = θp̃1 and p̂2 = θp̃2. But then, x̂ is
such that p̂x̂(t) = p̂w(t) and ut(x̂(t)) ≥ ut(y), for all y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : p̂x =
p̂w(t)}, for each t ∈ T . Therefore, the pair (p̂, x̂) is a Walras equilibrium.
Suppose now that the pair (p̂, x̂) is a Walras equilibrium. Then, x̂ is Pareto
optimal, by the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics. Hence, x̂
is Pareto optimal if and only if the pair (p̂, x̂) is a Walras equilibrium.
We study now the relationship between the set of Cournot-Nash alloca-
tions, the core, and the set of Walras allocations.
We say that an allocation y dominates an allocation x via a coalition S
if ut(y(t)) > ut(x(t)), for each t ∈ S, and
∫
S y(t) dµ =
∫
S w(t) dµ. The core
is the set of all allocations which are not dominated via any coalition. The
following corollary is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let b̂ be a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium and let p̂ = p(b̂) and x̂(t) = x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂)), for each t ∈ T .
Then, x̂ is in the core if and only if the pair (p̂, x̂) is a Walras equilibrium.
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Proof. Let b̂ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let p̂ = p(b̂) and x̂(t) =
x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂)), for each t ∈ T . Suppose that x̂ is in the core. Then, x̂
is Pareto optimal. But then, the pair (p̂, x̂) is a Walras equilibrium, by
Theorem 2. Suppose that the pair (p̂, x̂) is a Walras equilibrium. Then, x̂
is in the core, by the same argument used by Aumann (1964) in the proof
of his main theorem. Hence, x̂ is in the core if and only if the pair (p̂, x̂) is
a Walras equilibrium.
The next proposition provides a characterization of Pareto optimal Cour-
not-Nash allocations. To prove it, we use a result obtained in Codognato et
al. (2015) which provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-
Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation. This characterization result re-
quires the following assumption.
Assumption 5. ut : R
2
+ → R is differentiable, for each t ∈ T1.
Our characterization of Pareto optimal Cournot-Nash allocations is the
following.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, let b̂ be a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium and let p̂ = p(b̂) and x̂(t) = x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂)), for each t ∈ T .
Then, x̂ is Pareto optimal if and only if x̂1(t) = 0 or x̂2(t) = 0, for each
t ∈ T1.
Proof. Let b̂ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let p̂ = p(b̂) and x̂(t) =
x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂)), for each t ∈ T . Suppose that x̂ is Pareto optimal. Then,
the pair (p̂, x̂) is a Walras equilibrium, by Theorem 2. But then, x̂1(t) = 0
or x̂2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T1, by Theorem 4 in Codognato et al. (2015).
Suppose that x̂1(t) = 0 or x̂2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T1. Then, the pair (p̂, x̂) is
a Walras equilibrium, by Theorem 4 in Codognato et al. (2015). But then,
x̂ is Pareto optimal, by Theorem 2. Hence, x̂ is Pareto optimal if and only
if x̂1(t) = 0 or x̂2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T1.
The following corollary provides a characterization of Cournot-Nash al-
locations which are in the core.
Corollary 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, let b̂ be a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium and let p̂ = p(b̂) and x̂(t) = x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂)), for each
t ∈ T . Then, x̂ is the core if and only if x̂1(t) = 0 or x̂2(t) = 0, for each
t ∈ T1.
Proof. Let b̂ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let p̂ = p(b̂) and x̂(t) =
x(t, b̂(t), p(b̂)), for each t ∈ T . Suppose that x̂ is in the core. Then, x̂
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is Pareto optimal. But then, x̂1(t) = 0 or x̂2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T1, by
Proposition 2. Suppose that x̂1(t) = 0 or x̂2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T1. Then
the pair (p̂, x̂) is a Walras equilibrium, by Theorem 4 in Codognato et al.
(2015). But then, x̂ is in the core, by the same argument used by Aumann
(1964) in the proof of his main theorem.
Examples 6, 7, 8, and 9 in Codognato et al. (2015) show that Theorem
2, Proposition 2, and Corollaries 1 and 2 hold non-vacuously.
5 Discussion of the model
This section is devoted to a discussion of some issues related to the existence
and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria.
It is straightforward to show, using Theorem 5 in Codognato et al.
(2015), that, in our mixed bilateral oligopoly framework, under Assump-
tions 1, 2, and 3, the set of Cournot-Nash allocations of the Shapley window
model coincides with the set of the Cournot-Nash allocations of the model
with commodity money proposed by Dubey and Shubik (1978) and of its
generalization to complete markets proposed by Amir et al. (1990). There-
fore, all the results obtained in this paper also hold for these models.
Let us further discuss now some features of the models in this class, when
considered in a bilateral oligopoly framework, and their relationships with
the results obtained in this paper.
Busetto et al. (2018) considered a mixed version of the Shapley window
model for exchange economies with any finite number of commodities and,
in their Theorem 2, they proved the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium. In this paper, we have considered a bilateral oligopoly version of the
model analyzed by Busetto et al. (2018). Nevertheless, our existence result,
Theorem 1, is not just a two-commodity case of Theorem 2 in Busetto et al.
(2018). While Assumptions 2 and 3 are the same in Busetto et al. (2018)
and here, Assumptions 1 and 4 differ. Let us analyze in more detail the
difference between the two versions of Assumptions 1 and 4 and the role
they play in the two existence proofs.
To be applied to our bilateral framework, Assumption 1 in Busetto et
al. (2018) could be restated as follows.
Assumption 1′. There is a coalition S such that µ(S∩T ) > 0, µ(Sc∩T ) >
0, w1(t) > 0, w2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ S, w1(t) = 0, w2(t) > 0, for each





It is clear that if an initial assignment w satisfies Assumption 1′, then
it also satisfies our Assumption 1. Assumption 1′ rules out the cases where
µ(S∩T0) = 0 or µ(Sc∩T0) = 0, that is those in which only the atoms hold one
of the two commodities. Therefore, the price convergence theorem proved by
Busetto et al. (2018), their Theorem 1, that holds only under Assumption
1′, cannot be used in the proof of our existence theorem. In order to cover
the case where one of the two commodities is held only by atoms, we have
proved a price convergence lemma which combines the argument used by
Busetto et al. (2018) in the proof of their Theorem 1 with another argument
used by Dubey and Shubik (1978) in the proof of their convergence result
for the purely atomic case, their Lemma 2. Moreover, we had to extend
the proof of Dubey and Shubik (1978), which holds under the assumption of
concave utility functions, to cover the case of quasi-concave utility functions,
as required by our Assumption 2.
Assumption 4 in Busetto et al. (2018) imposes a relation between com-
modities based on traders’ characteristics, called relation C, and it requires
that the set of commodities is strongly connected in terms of relation C,
i.e., through traders’ characteristics. It could be recasted, in the bilateral
framework, as follows. We say that commodities i, j stand in relation C if
there is a coalition T i such that T i ⊂ {t ∈ T0 : wi(t) > 0, wj(t) = 0}, ut(·)
is differentiable, additively separable, i.e., ut(x) = v
i
t(x
i) + vjt (x
j), for each
x ∈ R2+, and
dvjt (0)
dxj
= +∞, for each t ∈ T i. Assumption 4 in Busetto et al.
(2018) can then be restated as follows.
Assumption 4′. Commodities 1 and 2 and commodities 2 and 1 stand in
relation C.
It is immediate to verify that neither our Assumption 4 implies As-
sumption 4′ nor the converse holds. Therefore, we can conclude that our
existence theorem is not a special case of the existence theorem in Busetto
et al. (2018).
Finally, let us notice that, in Section 2, we have provided a definition
of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium referring explicitly to irreducible matrices.
This definition applies only to active Cournot-Nash equilibria according to
the definition of Sahi and Yao (1989). Nevertheless, in the Shapley window
model, as in all other strategic market games, the strategy selection b̂ such
that b̂(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T , is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, usually called
trivial equilibrium. This raises the question whether, under Assumptions
1-4, the allocation corresponding to the trivial Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
namely the initial assignment w, may be Pareto optimal. The following
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proposition provides a negative answer to this question.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, the allocation w is not
Pareto optimal.
Proof. Suppose that w is Pareto optimal. Then, there exists a price vector p̃
such that the pair (p̃,w) is an efficiency equilibrium, by the same argument
used in the proof of Theorem 2. But then, the pair (p̃,w) is a Walras
equilibrium. Therefore, the necessary Kuhn-Tucker conditions lead to the
same contradiction as in the proof of Theorem 1. Hence, the allocation w
is not Pareto optimal.
6 Conclusion
In Theorem 1, we have shown the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
for the mixed bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model first
analyzed by Codognato et al. (2015). Then, in Theorem 2, we have proved
that a Cournot-Nash allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a Wal-
ras allocation. The proof of this theorem is crucially based on a corollary
in Shitovitz (1973), showing that the first and second welfare theorem still
hold in mixed exchange economies. In their main theorem, Codognato et al.
(2015) proved that, under a further differentiability assumption on atoms’
utility functions, the condition which characterizes the nonempty intersec-
tion of the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations requires that each
atom demands a null amount of one commodity. Combining this result
with our Theorem 2 we have obtained, as a proposition, a characteriza-
tion of the optimality property of Cournot-Nash equilibria, which requires
that at a Pareto optimal Cournot-Nash equilibrium each atom demands a
null amount of one commodity. Recasting antitrust analysis in the bilateral
oligopoly framework, we could use these results in further research as a first
step to analyze competition policy in a general equilibrium framework.
In the previous section, we have already stressed that the results we have
obtained for the bilateral version of the Shapley window model also hold for
other prototypes of strategic market games in the line inspired by Shapley
and Shubik (1977). Moreover, we have pointed out some issues connected
with existence and Pareto optimality which in our opinion deserve to be
considered for future research. A further question we propose to answer in
forthcoming work is if the results obtained in this paper hold for another type
of strategic market game, that is the one with fiat money first introduced
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by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1978) and further analyzed by Peck et al.
(1992), Koutsougeras and Ziros (2008), Koutsougeras (2009), among others.
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